Not to mention the rate of youth unemployment

Taken from the economic angle, the fall of the Berlin wall marks the beginning of a process of growing divergence between the two French and German models. Faced with the immense shock of reunification and the loss of competitiveness which ensued, the Germany made the choice of wage moderation to regain its industrial competitiveness, to become the global champion of exports. The France, she chose to turn to the services and promoted its domestic demand. Today, the hexagon appears slightly winner: "over the period 1992-2009, the average annual growth of GDP amounted to 1.7 French, 1.2 German side, noted Jean - Francois Jamet to the Robert Schuman Foundation, and the gap is even greater since 2000: 1.5 versus 0.8.". But the most interesting is that the growth in both countries has been weaker than in the euro area, in the EU or the United States. "Back on two routes halftone.

The unification of the Germany in 1990 course represents a colossal economic shock. "The country had to absorb a huge negative capital stock, explains Stefan Kooths, of the Institute of conjuncture DIW." The Treuhand, in charge of privatizing East German industrial apparatus, has finished its work with a debt of 200 billion (100 billion euros). "The Germany embarked on a large-scale investment program: renovation of German infrastructure and building construction. But the tax benefits associated with the real programs lead to build up overcapacity which will translate into a crisis of the building. "From 1995 to 2005, the sector has lost about half of its jobs, said Stefan Kooths, which obviously weighed on the economy.Moreover, "the Government chooses to convert the East German mark at a rate of 1: 1, which, added to the constitutional principle of equality of conditions of life for all German citizens, led to a strong deterioration in competitiveness", said Sylvain Broyer, responsible of the Department of Economics at Natixis.

1993, year hinge

Hinge, where the two neighbours adopt different strategies, it is however the crisis of 1993: "France and Germany are conflicting analyses, shows Jean-François Jamet: the France persists in a Keynesian consumption support policies, while the Germany diagnostic rather a problem of supply, where emphasis on price competitiveness."Goal: sell the most possible abroad, via these SMEs large specialized on narrow niches almost unparalleled expertise to meet a request strong emerging economies in the phase of catch-up and equipment. The share of exports in GDP was in 1994, of 23.1 in Germany, and 21.8 in France. In 2008, the ratio was mounted at 47.3 in Germany, 26.4 in France. First with a great wage moderation. "Unions accepted lower wage upgradings in exporting branches, including because they were under the threat of massive relocations", is Arnaud Lechevalier, Professor at the Viadrina University. Some relocations have place despite everything: "The Germany has used its eastern Hinterland to split the value chain," notes Lionel Fontagné, Counsellor at CEPII. The idea: produce low-cost components in the East, assemble in Germany, affix the label "Made in Germany" and send to the client.

Dichotomy request/offer

Throughout the period, the two countries persist in this dichotomy request/offer. While the France with the law on the 35-hour takes care of household consumers, the Germany three points increases VAT in 2007, penalizing the same blow products imported. Where the reproach addressed to Berlin to carry out a "non-coopérative" strategy: the Germany benefit of the application of the other countries buy much. A scheme that pays in period of growth of world trade, but makes the country very vulnerable to the crisis of 2008: German GDP expected to decline this year by 5, much lower than in France, and should find its level of 2008 than in 2013.

The France risk Italian syndrome

What cause rebalancing "There are limits on the decomposition of the value chain, said Lionel Fontagné, you can not constantly maintain wages under pressure to achieve gains of competitiveness."Moreover, emerging countries invest more in research and development and compete more and more German products, including the most sophisticated. While the German population decreases, the risk of deflation in the Japanese is not excluded, if wages continue to stagnate. The contract of the center-right government Merkel coalition also appears to announce an inflection: tax breaks and benefits to families are expected to revive domestic demand.

The French model, also questionné. The risk, this time, it is the Italian syndrome: a debt so strong that the margins for manoeuvre are extremely reduced. It will be necessary, on side of Rhine, likely just penalize consumers for healthier public finances. Each country should take a step in the direction of the other.

Socially, the two models have their left behind. Germany, unemployment is indeed structurally more low. But the stagnation of the lowest wages, the decline of unions, the decentralization of wage negotiations and the casualization of labour contracts begin social climbing opportunities. In France, the help given to the lowest wages caused a sense of decommissioning in the middle classes. Not to mention the rate of youth unemployment. "None of the two models is really satisfactory, said Sylvain Broyer.". The two countries, as the whole of the G7, will eat their black bread in the coming years, as Brazilians, Indians, the Chinese will take an increasing share of the cake world.